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We consider the design of prediction market mechanisms known as automated market makers. We show
that we can design these mechanisms via the mold of exponential family distributions, a popular and well-
studied probability distribution template used in statistics. We give a full development of this relationship
and explore a range of benefits. We draw connections between the information aggregation of market prices
and the belief aggregation of learning agents that rely on exponential family distributions. We develop a
very natural analysis of the market behavior as well as the price equilibrium under the assumption that
the traders exhibit risk aversion according to exponential utility. We also consider similar aspects under
alternative models, such as when traders are budget constrained.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics; I.2.6 [Artificial
Intelligence]: Learning
General Terms: Algorithms, Economics
Additional Key Words and Phrases: logarithmic score, exponential family, maximum entropy, risk aversion,
budget constraints
1. INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets are aggregation mechanisms that allow market prices to be inter-
preted as predictive probabilities on an event. Each trader in the market is assumed
to have some private information that he uses to make a prediction on the outcome
of the event. Traders are allowed to report their beliefs by buying and selling securi-
ties whose ultimate payoff depends on the future outcome. This will affect the state
of the market, thus updating the predictive probabilities for the event. Further, since
the trades are done sequentially, the trader is allowed to observe all past trades in the
market and update his private information based on this information. In this sense the
market prices, which are in effect the prices at which the marginal trader is willing
to buy or sell the available securities, can be interpreted as an aggregate “consensus
probability forecast” of the event in question.
Much of the work on prediction market design has focused heavily on structural prop-
erties of the mechanism: incentive compatibility, the market maker loss, the available
liquidity, the fluctuations of the prices as a function of the trading volume, to name
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a few. Absent from much of the literature is a corresponding semantics of the market
behavior or the observed prices. That is, how can we interpret the equilibrium mar-
ket state when we have a number of traders with diverse beliefs on the underlying
state of the world? In what sense is the market an aggregation mechanism? Do price
changes relate to our usual Bayesian notion of information incorporation via posterior
updating?
In the present work we show that a number of classical statistical tools can be lever-
aged to design a prediction market framework in the mold of exponential family dis-
tributions; we show that this statistical framework leads to a number of attractive
properties and interpretations. Common concepts in statistics—including entropymax-
imization, log loss, and bayesian inference—relate to natural aspects of our class of
mechanisms. In particular, the central objects in our market framework can be inter-
preted via concepts used to define exponential families:
— the market’s payoff function corresponds to the sufficient statistics of the distribution;
— the vector of outstanding shares in the market corresponds to the natural parameter
vector of the distribution;
— the market prices correspond to mean parameters;
— the market’s cost function corresponds to the distribution’s log-partition function.
We begin in Section 2 with a discussion of scoring rules based on exponential family
distributions, and we show how the framework leads to a variety of scoring rules for
continuous outcome spaces. We turn our attention to market design in Section 3 and
give a full description of our proposed mechanisms. In addition to showing the syn-
tactic relationship between exponential families and prediction markets, we explore a
number of rich semantic implications as well. In particular, we show that our formu-
lation allows us to analyze the evolution of the market under various models of trader
behavior:
— Trader behavior varies depending on how they assimilate information; for example,
should we consider our agents as Bayesians or frequentists. In Section 4 we consider
traders that use a conjugate prior to update their beliefs, and we study how their
trades would affect the market state.
— In Section 5 we consider risk-averse agents that optimize their bets according to ex-
ponential utility. In this case we can characterize precisely how a single trader in-
teracts with the market, as well as the equilibrium reached given multiple traders;
this result is achieved via a potential game argument. The eventual market state
is a weighted combination of traders’ beliefs and the initial state; the weights are
proportional to risk aversion parameters.
— In Section 6 we consider budget-limited traders who are constrained in how much
they influence the market. We analyze the market under these circumstances; we
are able to show that traders with good information can expect to profit and their
influence over the market state increases over time whereas malicious traders have
limited impact on the market.
RelatedWork. The notion of an exponential family distribution is fundamental to this
paper. For comprehensive introductions to these distributions, see [Barndorff-Nielsen
1978; Wainwright and Jordan 2008]. Exponential families are intimately tied to the
notions of log loss and entropy, but can be generalized to other types of convex losses
and information, as shown by Gru¨nwald and Dawid [2004], who also make a connec-
tion to scoring rules.
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Scoring rules are a measure of prediction accuracy, and we are concerned here
with scoring rules for statistic expectations, typically over infinite outcome spaces.
Such rules have been characterized by Savage [1971]; see also [Frongillo 2013;
Lambert et al. 2008]. Our rules are of course special cases of this characterization,
but it appears the range of elegant scoring rules that arise from exponential families
has not been appreciated. Indeed, Gneiting and Raftery [2007] observe that specific
instances of scoring rules for continuous outcomes are lacking, and survey various
possibilities.
In a seminal paper, Hanson [2003] showed how to form a prediction market based on
a sequentially-shared scoring rule, and specifically proposed the logarithmic market
scoring rule (LMSR) based on log loss for finite outcome spaces [Hanson 2007]. The
markets we introduce are direct generalizations of the LMSR to continuous outcomes,
but take the form of cost-function based markets as introduced by Chen and Pennock
[2007]. Gao et al. [2009] and Chen et al. [2013] also consider extending various market
makers to infinite outcome spaces.
Prediction markets are known to perform well in practice [Pennock and Sami 2007;
Pennock et al. 2001]. However, a sound theory for interpreting trader behavior and
market prices is an ongoing area of study [Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006]. At one ex-
treme, agents are assumed myopic and risk-neutral, implying they move the market
state to their belief [Chen and Vaughan 2010]. At the other extreme, agents are strate-
gic and the market fully incorporates all information [Ostrovsky 2012].
We are not aware of any works that consider risk-averse agents within cost-function
based markets. However, risk aversion is a fundamental component of mathemati-
cal finance and portfolio optimization, and there are close connections between the
notion of a cost function and that of a convex risk measure [Fo¨llmer and Schied
2002; Fo¨llmer and Knispel 2011]. Indeed, they arise from the same axioms as noted
by Othman and Sandholm [2011]. We see the potential to draw more on the mathe-
matical finance literature to take into account risk aversion, as prediction markets
are simply single-period financial markets [Fo¨llmer and Schied 2004, Part I]. We also
note that connections between Machine Learning and market mechanisms have been
explored in [Storkey 2011].
2. GENERALIZED LOG SCORING RULES
We consider a measurable space consisting of a set of outcomes X together with a σ-
algebra F . An agent or expert has a belief over potential outcomes taking the form
of a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to a base measure ν.1
Throughout we represent the belief as the corresponding density p with respect to ν.
Let P denote the set of all such probability densities.
We are interested in eliciting information about the agent’s belief, in particular expec-
tation information. Let φ : X → Rd be a vector-valued random variable or statistic,
where d is finite. The aim is to elicit µ = Ep[φ(x)] where x is the random outcome. A
scoring rule is a device for this purpose. Let
M =
{
µ ∈ Rd : Ep[φ(x)] = µ, for some p ∈ P
}
1Recall that a measure P is absolutely continuous with respect to ν if P (A) = 0 for every A ∈ F for which
ν(A) = 0. In essence the base measure ν restricts the support of P . In our examples ν will typically be a
restriction of the Lebesgue measure for continuous outcomes or the counting measure for discrete outcomes.
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be the set of realizable statistic expectations. A scoring rule S : M× X → R ∪ {−∞}
pays the agent S(µˆ, x) according to how well its report µˆ ∈M agrees with the eventual
outcome x ∈ X . The following definition is due to Lambert et al. [2008].
Definition 2.1. A scoring rule S is proper for statistic φ if for each µ ∈M and p ∈ P
with expected statistic µ, we have for all µˆ 6= µ
Ep[S(µ, x)] ≥ Ep[S(µˆ, x)]. (1)
Given a proper scoring rule S any affine transformation S˜(µ, x) = aS(µ, x)+ b(x) of the
rule, with a > 0 and b an arbitrary real-valued function of the outcomes, again yields
a proper scoring rule termed equivalent [Dawid 1998; Gneiting and Raftery 2007].
Throughout we will implicitly apply such affine transformations to obtain the clear-
est version of the scoring rule. We will also focus on scoring rules where inequality (1)
is strict to avoid trivial cases such as constant scoring rules.
Classically, scoring rules take in the entire density p rather than just some statistic,
and incentive compatibility must hold over all of P . When the outcome space is large
or infinite, it is not feasible to directly communicate p, so the definition allows for
summary information of the belief.
Note that Definition 2.1 places only mild information requirements on the part of the
agent to ensure truthful reporting. Because condition (1) holds for all p consistent
with expectation µ, it is enough for the agent to simply know the latter and not the
complete density to be properly incentivized. However, the agent must also agree with
the support of the density as implicitly defined by base measure ν.
When the outcome space is finite we recover classical scoring rules by using the statis-
tic φ : X → {0, 1}X that maps an outcome x to a unit vector with a 1 in the component
corresponding to x. The expectation of φ is then exactly the probability mass function.
2.1. Proper Scoring from Maximum Entropy
Our starting point for designing proper scoring rules is the classic logarithmic scor-
ing rule for eliciting probabilities in the case of finite outcomes. This rule is simply
S(p, x) = log p(x), namely we take the log likelihood of the reported density at the
eventual outcome. To generalize the rule to expected statistics rather than full densi-
ties, we consider a subset of densities D ⊆ P . If there is a bijection between the sets D
andM, then we say thatM parametrizes D and write p(· ;µ) for the density mapping
to µ. Given such a family parametrized by the relevant statistics, the generalized log
scoring rule is then
S(µ, x) = log p(x;µ). (2)
Even though the log score is only applied to densities from D, according to Defini-
tion 2.1 it must work over all densities in P . It turns out this is possible if D is cho-
sen appropriately, drawing on a well-known duality between maximum likelihood and
maximum entropy [Gru¨nwald and Dawid 2004].
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Exponential Families. We let p(x;µ) be the maximum entropy distribution with ex-
pected statistic µ. Specifically, it is the solution to the following program:2
min
p∈P
F (p) s.t. Ep[φ(x)] = µ, (3)
where the objective function is the negative entropy of the distribution, namely
F (p) =
∫
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) dν(x).
Note that the explicit set of constraints in (3) are linear, whereas the objective is con-
vex. We let G : M → R be the optimal value function of (3), meaning G(µ) is the
negative entropy of the maximum entropy distribution with expected statistics µ.
It is well-known that solutions to (3) are exponential family distributions, whose den-
sities with respect to ν take the form
p(x; θ) = exp(〈θ, φ(x)〉 − T (θ)). (4)
The density is stated here in terms of its natural parametrization θ ∈ Rd, where θ
arises as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the linear constraints in (3). The
term T (θ) essentially arises as the multiplier for the normalization constraint (the
density must integrate to 1), and so ensures that (4) is normalized:
T (θ) = log
∫
X
exp〈θ, φ(x)〉 dν(x). (5)
The function T is known as the log-partition or cumulant function corresponding to
the exponential family. Its domain is Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : T (θ) < +∞}, called the natural
parameter space. The exponential family is regular ifΘ is open—almost all exponential
families of interest, and all those we consider in this work, are regular. The family
is minimal if there is no α ∈ Θ such that 〈α, φ(x)〉 is a constant over X (ν-almost
everywhere); minimality is a property of the associated statistic φ, usually called the
sufficient statistic in the literature.
The following proposition collects the relevant results on regular exponential families;
proofs may be found inWainwright and Jordan [2008, Prop. 3.1–3.2, Thm. 3.3–3.4] and
see also Banerjee et al. [2005a, Lem. 1, Thm. 2]. A convex function T is of Legendre type
if it is proper, closed, strictly convex and differentiable on the interior of its domain,
and limθ→θ¯ ||∇T (θ)|| = +∞ when θ¯ lies on the boundary of the domain.
PROPOSITION 2.1. Consider a regular exponential family with minimal sufficient
statistic. The following properties hold:
(1) T and G are of Legendre type, and T = G∗ (equivalently G = T ∗).
(2) The gradient map ∇T is one-to-one and onto the interior of M. Its inverse is ∇G
which is one-to-one and onto the interior of Θ.
(3) The exponential family distribution with natural parameter θ ∈ Θ has expected
statistic µ = Ep[φ(x)] = ∇T (θ).
(4) The maximum entropy distribution with expected statistic µ is the exponential fam-
ily distribution with natural parameter θ = ∇G(µ).
2We assume that the minimum is finite and achieved for all µ ∈ M. Some care is needed to ensure this holds
for specific statistics and outcome spaces. For example, taking outcomes to be the real numbers, there is no
maximum entropy distribution with a given mean µ (one can take densities tending towards the uniform
distribution over the reals), but there is always a solution if we constrain both the mean and variance.
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In the above T ∗ denotes the convex conjugate of T , which here can be evaluated as
T ∗(µ) = supθ∈Θ〈θ, µ〉 − T (θ). Similarly, G
∗(θ) = supµ∈M〈θ, µ〉 −G(µ).
Proper Log Scoring. We are now in a position to analyze the log scoring rule under ex-
ponential family distributions. From our discussion so far, we have that an exponential
family density can be parametrized either by the natural parameter θ, or by the mean
parameter µ, and that the two are related by the invertible gradient map µ = ∇T (θ).
We will write p(x; θ) or p(x;µ) given the parametrization used.
The following observation is crucial. Let p˜ ∈ P be a density (not necessarily from an
exponential family) with expected statistic µ, let p(· ;µ) be the exponential family with
the same expected statistic, and let µˆ ∈M be an alternative report. Then from (4) note
Ep˜[log p(x; µˆ)] = Ep(·;µ)[log p(x; µˆ)] = 〈θˆ, µ〉 − T (θˆ), (6)
where θˆ = ∇G(µˆ) is the natural parameter for the exponential family with statistic µˆ.
We see from this that the expected log score only depends on the expectation µ of the
underlying density, not the full density, which is how we can achieve proper scoring
according to Definition 2.1.
THEOREM 2.2. Consider the logarithmic scoring rule S(µ, x) = log p(x;µ) defined
over a set of densities D parametrized byM. The scoring rule is proper if and only if D
is the exponential family with statistic φ.
PROOF. Let µ, µˆ ∈ M be the agent’s true belief and an alternative report, and let
p ∈ P be a density consistent with µ. Let θ = ∇G(µ) and θˆ = ∇G(µˆ), and note that
µ = ∇T (θ). We have
Ep[log p(x;µ)]−Ep[log p(x; µˆ)] = 〈θ, µ〉 − T (θ)− 〈θˆ, µ〉+ T (θˆ)
= T (θˆ)− T (θ)− 〈θˆ − θ, µ〉
= T (θˆ)− T (θ)− 〈θˆ − θ,∇T (θ)〉. (7)
The latter is positive by the strict convexity of T , which shows that the log score is
proper. For the converse, assume the defined log score is proper. By the Savage char-
acterization of proper scoring rules for expectations (see Gneiting and Raftery [2007,
Thm. 1] and Savage [1971]), we must have
S(µ, x) = G(µ)− 〈∇G(µ), µ − φ(x)〉
for some strictly convex function G. Let T = G∗, so that ∇G = ∇T−1, and let θ =
∇G(µ). Then the above can be written as
log p(x;µ) = G(µ)− 〈∇G(µ), µ − φ(x)〉
= 〈θ, µ〉 − T (θ)− 〈θ, µ− φ(x)〉 = 〈θ, φ(x)〉 − T (θ),
which shows that p(x;µ) takes the form of an exponential family.
As further intuition for the result, note that (7) is the definition of the ‘Bregman diver-
gence’ with respect to strictly convex function T , written DT . Therefore we have
Ep[log p(x;µ)] −Ep[log p(x; µˆ)] = DT (θˆ, θ) = DG(µ, µˆ),
where the last equality is a well-known identity relating the Bregman divergences of
T and T ∗ = G. The equation states that the agent’s regret from misreporting its mean
parameter does not depend on the full density p, only the mean µ.
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2.2. Examples: Moments over the Real Line
Theorem 2.2 leads to a straightforward procedure for constructing score rules for ex-
pectations. Define the relevant statistic, and consider the maximum entropy (equiva-
lently, exponential family) distribution consistent with the agent’s reported mean µ.
The scoring rule compensates the agent according to the log likelihood of the eventual
outcome according to this distribution. The interpretation is that the agent is only pro-
viding partial information about the underlying density, so the principal first infers a
full density according to the principle of maximum entropy, and then scores the agent
using the usual log score.
An advantage of this generalization of the log score is that, for many domains (multi-
dimensional included) and expectations of interest, it leads to novel closed-form scor-
ing rules. By examining the log densities of various exponential families, we can for
instance obtain scoring rules for several different combinations of the arithmetic, geo-
metric, and harmonic means, as well as higher order moments. The following examples
illustrate the construction.
Example 2.3. As base measure we take the Lebesgue restricted to [0,+∞), and we
consider the statistic φ(x) = x so that we are simply eliciting the mean. The maximum
entropy distribution with a given mean µ is the exponential distribution, and taking
its log density gives the scoring rule
S(µ, x) = −
x
µ
− logµ. (8)
We stress that although this rule is derived from the exponential distribution, The-
orem 2.2 implies that it elicits the mean of any distribution supported on the non-
negative reals (e.g., Pareto, lognormal). Indeed, it is easy to see that the expected
score (8) depends only on the mean of the agent’s belief because it is linear in x. As
a generalization of this example, the maximum entropy distribution for the k-th mo-
ment φ(x) = xk with respect to the same base measure is the Weibull distribution.
Taking its log density leads to the following equivalent scoring rule:
S(µ, x) = (k − 1) log x− k logµ− Γ
(
1 +
1
k
)k (
x
µ
)k
, (9)
where Γ denotes the gamma function (the extension of the factorial to the reals). We
have not found either scoring rule (8) or (9) in the literature.
Example 2.4. As a base measure we take the Lebesgue over the real numbers R.
We are interested in eliciting the mean µ and variance σ2, so as a statistic we take
φ(x) = (x, x2) for which Ep[φ(x)] = (µ, µ
2 + σ2). The max entropy distribution for a
given mean and variance is the Gaussian, whose log density gives the scoring rule
S((µ, σ2), x) = −
(x− µ)2
σ2
− log σ2. (10)
Again, we stress that this scoring rule elicits the mean and variance of any density
over the real numbers, not just those of a normal distribution. The construction eas-
ily generalizes to a multi-dimensional outcome space by taking the log density of the
multivariate normal:
S((µ,Σ), x) = −(x− µ)′Σ−1(x − µ)− log |Σ|. (11)
Here the statistics being elicited are the mean vector µ and the covariance matrix Σ.
These scoring rules have been studied by Dawid and Sebastiani [1999] as rules that
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only depend on the mean and variance of the reported density. They note that these
rules are weakly proper (because they do not distinguish between densities with the
same first and second moments), but do not make the point that knowledge of the full
density is not necessary on the part of the agent.
In the above, Example 2.4 illustrates an important point about parametrizations of the
elicited expectations. The variance σ2 cannot be written as E[φ(x)] for any φ, because
the mean µ enters the definition of σ2 but is not available when φ is defined (indeed it
is elicited in tandem with the variance).3 Instead one must use the first two uncentered
moments E[x] and E[x2]. These are in bijection with µ and σ2, so the resulting scoring
rule can be re-written in terms of the latter. Therefore, it is possible to elicit not just
expectations but also bijective transformations of expectations.
3. EXPONENTIAL FAMILY MARKETS
In a single-agent setting, a scoring rule is used to elicit the agent’s belief. In a multi-
agent setting, a prediction market can be used to aggregate the beliefs of the agents. In
his seminal paper Hanson [2003] introduced the idea of a market scoring rule, which
inherits the appealing elicitation and aggregation properties of both in order to per-
form well in thin or thick markets. In this section, we adapt the generalized log scor-
ing rule to a market scoring rule which leads to markets with simple closed-form cost
functions for many statistics of interest.
3.1. Prediction Market
In a prediction market an agent’s expected belief µ is elicited indirectly through the
purchase and sale of contingent claim securities. Under this approach, each compo-
nent i of the statistic φ is interpreted as the payoff function of a security; that is, a
single share of security i pays off φi(x) when x ∈ X occurs. Thus if the portfolio of
shares held by the agent is δ ∈ Rd, where entry δi corresponds to the number of shares
of security i, then the payoff to the agent when x occurs is evaluated by taking the
inner product 〈δ, φ(x)〉.
As a concrete example, recall that in the classic finite-outcome case the statistic has
a component for each outcome x such that φx(x
′) = 1 if x′ = x and 0 otherwise.
Therefore the corresponding security pays 1 dollar if outcome x occurs. (These are
known as Arrow-Debreu securities.) In Example 2.3 the one-dimensional statistic is
φ(x) = x, corresponding to a security whose payoff is linear in the outcome x ∈ R+.
(This amounts to a futures contract.)
The standard way to implement a prediction market in the literature, due
to Chen and Pennock [2007], is via a centralized market maker. The market maker
maintains a convex, differentiable cost function C : Rd → (−∞,+∞], where C(θ)
records the revenue collected when the vector of outstanding shares is θ. The cost
to an agent of purchasing portfolio δ under a market state of θ is C(θ + δ)− C(θ), and
therefore the instantaneous prices of the securities are given by the gradient ∇C(θ).
A risk-neutral agent will choose to acquire shares up to the point where, for each
share, expected payoff equals marginal price. Formally, if the agent acquires portfolio
3This is an intuitive but far from formal explanation for the fact that the dimension of the message space,
or elicitation complexity, for eliciting the variance is at least 2 [Lambert et al. 2008].
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δ, moving the market state vector to θ′ = θ + δ, then we must have
Ep[φ(x)] = ∇C(θ
′). (12)
In this way, by its choice of δ, the agent reveals that its expected belief is µ = ∇C(θ′).
We stress that this observation relies on the assumptions that 1) the agent is risk-
neutral, 2) the agent does not incorporate the market’s information into its own be-
liefs, and 3) the agent is not budget constrained. We will examine relaxations of each
assumption in later sections.
3.2. Information-Theoretic Interpretation
In the remainder of this paper we focus on the following cost function, which arises
from the “generalized” logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR):
C(θ) = log
∫
x∈X
exp〈θ, φ(x)〉 dν(x). (13)
This is of course exactly the log-partition function (5) for the exponential family with
sufficient statistic φ, and we recover the classic LMSR using outcome indicator vectors
as statistics. Because an agent would never select a portfolio with infinite cost, the
effective domain (i.e., the possible vectors of outstanding shares) of C is Θ = {θ ∈ Rd :
C(θ) < +∞}, which gives an economic interpretation to the natural parameter space
of an exponential family.
The correspondence between the cost function (13) and the log-partition function (5)
suggests the following interpretation. The market maker maintains an exponential
family distribution over the state space X parametrized by share vectors that lie in Θ.
When an agent buys shares, it moves the distribution’s natural parameter so that the
market prices matches its beliefs, or in other words the market’s mean parametrization
matches the agent’s expectation.
There is a well-known duality between scoring rules and cost-function based mar-
kets [Abernethy et al. 2013; Hanson 2003]. To see this in our context, recall from (6):
Ep˜[log p(x; µˆ)] = 〈θˆ, µ〉 − T (θˆ)
where p˜ is the agent’s belief and µˆ the agent’s report. The expected log score from
reporting µˆ is exactly the same as the expected payoff from buying portfolio of shares
θˆ = ∇C(µˆ) (assuming an initial market state of 0), as 〈θˆ, µ〉 is the expected revenue
and T (θˆ) is the cost. As in Section 2 this reasoning relies on the assumption of risk-
neutrality, not on any specific form for the agent’s belief.
The agent’s expected profit from moving the share vector from θ to θ′ is
〈θ′ − θ, µ〉 − C(θ′) + C(θ)
= C(θ) − C(θ′)− 〈θ − θ′,∇C(θ)〉
= DC(θ, θ
′) = DC∗(µ
′, µ),
recalling (7). Now Banerjee et al. [2005b] have observed (among others) that the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between two exponential family distributions is the Breg-
man divergence, with repect to the log-partition function, between their natural pa-
rameters. The agent’s expected profit is therefore the KL divergence between the mar-
ket’s implied expectation and the exponential family corresponding to the agent’s ex-
pectation, a well-known property from the classical LMSR [Hanson 2007].
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3.3. Examples: Real Line and the Sphere
Let us now revisit our scoring rule examples from Section 2 in the context of prediction
markets. The relevant entities now are the payoff function, the effective domain of
shares, and the cost function.
Example 3.1. We consider outcomes over the positive realsR+ and set up a market
for the expected outcome, consisting of a single security that pays off φ(x) = x. The log
partition function of the exponential distribution leads to the following cost function:
C(θ) = − log(−θ).
The effective domain is Θ = {θ ∈ R : θ < 0}. This means the market must start with
a negative number of outstanding shares for the security, and the number of shares
must stay negative. The market maker need not explicitly enforce this, because by the
Legendre property of C the cost tends to +∞ as the outstanding shares approach the
boundary, which is straightforward to see in this example.
Example 3.2. We consider outcomes over the real line R and set up a market with
securities corresponding to the first two uncenteredmoments (i.e, agents are betting on
the return and volatility). The securities are defined by the payoffs φ(x) = (x, x2). The
log partition function of the normal distribution, under its natural parametrization,
leads to the following cost function:
C(θ) = −
θ21
4θ2
−
1
2
log(−2θ2).
The effective domain is Θ = {(θ1, θ2) ∈ R
2 : θ2 < 0}. Again, we have here an instance
where it is not possible for the number of outstanding shares of the second security
to exceed 0. However, an arbitrary amount of the securities can be sold short, which
corresponds to increasing the variance of the market’s estimate.
Example 3.3. As another example let the outcome space be the d-dimensional unit
sphere. This setting was considered by Abernethy et al. [2013] who provide a cost func-
tion implicitly defined through a variational characterization. The maximum entropy
approach leads to another alternative. We have a security for each of the d dimensions,
and security i simply pays off φi(x) = xi, where x ∈ R
d is the unit-norm outcome. The
maximum entropy distribution over the sphere with such sufficient statistics is the
von Mises-Fisher distribution. The log partition function corresponds to
C(θ) = I d
2
−1(||θ||) −
(
d
2
− 1
)
log ||θ||,
where Ir refers to the modified Bessel function of first kind and order r;
see Banerjee et al. [2005b] for an explanation of these quantities. The effective domain
of θ is the positive orthant in Rd. The mean parametrization of the von Mises-Fisher
distribution gives a generalized log scoring rule for the expected outcome components,
but it is unwieldy and involves several special functions.
4. BAYESIAN TRADERS WITH LINEAR UTILITY
In the standard model of cost-function based prediction markets, a sequence of my-
opic, risk-neutral agents arrive and trade in the market [Chen and Pennock 2007;
Chen and Vaughan 2010]. As we saw in Section 3.1, such a trader moves the prices
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to its own expectation µ. However, this means that the market does not performmean-
ingful aggregation of agents’ beliefs, as the final prices are simply the final agent’s
expectation.
In this section we examine the aggregation behavior of the market when agents are
Bayesian and take into account the current market state when forming their beliefs.
This requires more structure to their beliefs. For this section and the remainder of the
paper, we will assume that agents have exponential family beliefs.
The exponential families framework is well-suited to reasoning about Bayesian up-
dates. As before let the data distribution be given by p(x; θ) = exp(〈θ, φ(x)〉 − T (θ))
where T is the log partition function and φ are the sufficient statistics. Instead of di-
rect beliefs about the data distribution the agent maintains a conjugate prior over the
parameters θ. Every exponential family admits a conjugate prior of the form
p(θ; b0) = exp(〈nν, θ〉 + nT (θ)− ψ(ν, n)).
Note that this is also an exponential family with natural parameter b0 = (nν, n) where
ν ∈ Rd and n is a positive integer. The sufficient statistic maps θ to (θ, T (θ)), and
the log partition function ψ is defined as the normalizer as usual. For a complete
treatment of exponential families conjugate priors, see for instance Barndorff-Nielsen
[1978]. Now Diaconis and Ylvisaker [1979, Thm. 2] and Jewell [1974] have shown that
Eθ∼b0Ex∼θ[φ(x)] = ν, (14)
meaning that ν = nν/n is the posterior mean. Thus, it is helpful to think of the prior as
being based on a ‘phantom’ sample of size n and mean ν. Suppose now that the agent
observes an empirical sample with mean µˆ and size m. By a standard derivation [see
Diaconis and Ylvisaker 1979], the posterior conjugate prior parameters become nν ←
nν +mµˆ and n← n+m, and the posterior expectation (14) evaluates to
nν +mµˆ
n+m
. (15)
Thus the posterior mean is a convex combination of the prior and empirical means,
and their relative weights depend on the phantom and empirical sample sizes.
Consider Bayesian agents maintaining an exponential family conjugate prior over the
data model’s natural parameters (equivalently, the expected security payoffs). Each
agent has access to a private sample of the data of size m with mean statistic µˆ. If n
agents have arrived before to trade, then the current market prices µ correspond to
the phantom sample, and the phantom sample size is nm. After forming the poste-
rior (15) with these substitutions, the (risk-neutral) agent purchases shares δ to move
the current market share vector to
∇C(θ + δ) =
nν + µˆ
n+ 1
.
As a result, the final market prices under this behavior are a simple average of the
agent’s mean parameters and the initial market prices. We note that to facilitate such
belief updating, the market should post the number of trades since initialization.
5. RISK-AVERSE TRADERS WITH EXPONENTIAL UTILITY
In this section we relax the standard assumption that agents in the market are risk-
neutral. We show that with sufficient extra structure to the agents’ beliefs and utilities,
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the market performs a clean aggregation of the agents’ beliefs via a simple weighted
average. Assume that the agent has an exponential utility function for wealth w:
Ua(w) = −
1
a
exp(−aw). (16)
Here a controls the risk aversion: the agent’s aversion grows as a increases, and as a
tends to 0 we approach linear utility (risk-neutrality). Specifically, a is the Arrow-Pratt
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and exponential utilities of the form (16) are the
unique utilities that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion [Varian 1992, Chap. 11].
If wealth is distributed according to a probability measure P , then the certainty equiv-
alent of a random amount of wealth is defined as
CE(w) = U−1a (EP [Ua(w)]).
Suppose as before that the agent’s belief over outcomes takes the form of a den-
sity p with respect to base measure ν. There is a close relationship between the
log-partition function and the certainty equivalent under exponential utility [see
Ben-Tal and Teboulle 2007].
LEMMA 5.1. The certainty equivalent of the agent’s expected profit, with exponential
utility, when acquiring shares δ under a market state of θ is
log a− T p(−aδ)− aC(θ + δ) + aC(θ), (17)
where T p is the log partition function (5) with a base measure of p dν. Furthermore, if
the agent’s belief is an exponential family with natural parameter θˆ, we have
T p(δ) = T (θˆ + δ)− T (θˆ),
where T is the usual log partition function with base measure ν.
PROOF. Explicitly, the certainty equivalent of the profit is
CE( 〈δ, φ(x)〉 − [C(θ + δ)− C(θ)] )
= − log
∫
X
1
a
exp (〈−aδ, φ(x)〉 + a[C(θ + δ)− C(θ)]) p(x)dν(x)
= log a− a[C(θ + δ)− C(θ)] − log
∫
X
exp〈−aδ, φ(x)〉 p(x) dν(x)
= log a− a[C(θ + δ)− C(θ)] − T p(−aδ).
For the second part of the result, we have
T p(δ) = log
∫
X
exp〈δ, φ(x)〉 p(x; θˆ) dν(x)
= log
∫
X
exp(〈δ + θˆ, φ(x)〉 − T (θˆ)) dν(x)
= T (θˆ + δ)− T (θˆ) + log
∫
X
exp(〈δ + θˆ, φ(x)〉 − T (θˆ + δ)) dν(x)
= T (θˆ + δ)− T (θˆ) + log
∫
X
p(x; θˆ + δ) dν(x) = T (θˆ + δ)− T (θˆ),
where the last line follows from the fact that density p(x; θˆ + δ) integrates to 1.
Recall that for the generalized LMSR, the cost function C is exactly the log parti-
tion function T . We are therefore lead to the following understanding of a risk-averse
agent’s behavior in such a market.
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THEOREM 5.2. Suppose an agent has exponential utility with coefficient a and ex-
ponential family beliefs with natural parameter θˆ. In the generalized LMSR market
with current market state θ, the agent’s optimal trade δ moves the state vector to
θ + δ =
1
1 + a
θˆ +
a
1 + a
θ. (18)
PROOF. The agent’s optimal trade maximizes its expected utility, or equivalently
the certainty equivalent. From Lemma 5.1 and that T = C, the agent maximizes
log a− T (θˆ − aδ) + T (θˆ)− aT (θ + δ) + aT (θ).
This objective is strictly concave, from the strict convexity of T . The optimum is there-
fore characterized by the first-order condition ∇T (θˆ − aδ) = ∇T (θ + δ). As the gradi-
ent map ∇T is one-to-one, this is solved by equating the arguments, which leads to
δ = (θˆ − θ)/(1 + a) and (18).
Note that as, a tends to 0, we approach risk neutrality and the agent moves the share
vector all the way to its private estimate θˆ. As a grows larger (the agent grows more
risk averse) the agent makes smaller trades to reduce it exposure, and the final state
stays closer to the current state θ. Update (18) implies that, under the conditions of the
theorem, a market that receives a sequence of myopic traders aggregates their natural
parameters in the form of an exponentially weightedmoving average. The final market
estimates (i.e., prices) are obtained by applying ∇T to this average.
Liquidity Adjustment. In practice the centralized market maker allows itself some con-
trol over the liquidity in the market, which captures how responsive prices are to
trades. To adjust liquidity we consider the parametrized cost Cλ(θ) =
1
λ
C (λθ). Here
λ is construed as the inverse liquidity, or price responsiveness. A larger setting of λ
means fewer shares need to be bought to reach the same prices.4
In the context of the generalized LMSR we write T rather than C where T is the
log partition function, with liquidity-adjusted version Tλ. Let µˆ be the agent’s mean
belief with corresponding natural parameter θˆ = ∇T−1(µˆ). Recall that a risk-neutral
agent moves the share vector so that the prices match its mean parameter. Therefore,
define the target shares as θ˜ = ∇T−1λ (µˆ). The target shares θˆ and natural parameter
θ˜ are related by ∇T (θˆ) = ∇Tλ(θ˜) = µˆ. In addition it is straightforward to check that
∇Tλ(θ˜) = ∇T (λθ˜) so we have
θ˜ = θˆ/λ. (19)
Higher price responsiveness means fewer shares must be bought to make the mar-
ket prices match the agent’s expectation, so the natural parameter is scaled down
accordingly. With a liquidity adjustment the analysis of Theorem 5.2 can be extended
and yields the following result, where as before θ and µ are the market’s outstanding
shares and prices respectively.
COROLLARY 5.3. Under the conditions of Theorem 5.2 and an inverse liquidity of λ,
the agent’s optimal trade δ moves the state vector to
θ + δ =
λ
λ+ a
θ˜ +
a
λ+ a
θ =
λ
λ+ a
∇T−1λ (µˆ) +
a
λ+ a
∇T−1λ (µ). (20)
4The liquidity adjustment to the cost function takes the same form as the risk-aversion adjustment to
the exponential utility in (16). In convex analysis, this transformation is known as the perspective func-
tion [Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal 2000, p. 90].
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According to (20), as λ grows large the agentmoves the market state closer to the target
shares, rather than its true natural parameter. Note that the target shares themselves
depend on λ by (19), but the update can be directly written in terms of the agent’s
beliefs as in the right-hand side of (20).
5.1. Repeated Trading and the Effective Belief
In previous sections we have analyzed trader behavior assuming it is his first entry
into the market. We now pose the question: how will a trader reason about a possible
future investment when the trader holds an existing portfolio? In the context of a
trader possessing an exponential family belief together with exponential utility, we
show that we can explicitly analyze how an agent incorporates an existing portfolio.
The key conclusion is that a trader will reason about a future investment simply as
though he had updated his belief and had no prior investment.
Suppose an exponential utility agent has exponential family belief parametrized by
natural parameter θˆ. Based on this belief, let δ1 be the vector of shares the agent has
purchased on first entry in the market. On a subsequent entry into this market with
market state θ′, his optimal purchase δ∗2 is given by the solution of
argmax
δ2
E
x∼p(x;θˆ)U [〈δ1 + δ2, φ(x)〉 − C(δ1 + θ) + C(θ) − C(δ2 + θ
′) + C(θ′)] .
Then if θ′′ = θˆ − aδ1 is the effective belief, the trader’s optimal purchase is given by
δ2 = (θ
′′ − θ′)/(1 + a), moving the share vector to θ′ + δ2 =
1
1+aθ
′′ + a1+aθ
′, which is a
convex combination of the effective belief and the current market state.
THEOREM 5.4. Suppose an exponential utility maximizing trader with utility pa-
rameter a who has belief θˆmakes a purchase δ in a market. On subsequently re-entering
the market, he will behave identically to an exponential utility maximizing trader with
belief θˆ − aδ and no prior exposure in the market.
Theorem 5.4 implies that financial exposure can be equivalently understood as chang-
ing the privately held beliefs.
5.2. Equilibrium Market State for Exponential Utility Agents
We have shown that every exponential-utility maximizing trader picks the share vec-
tor δ so that the eventual market state can be represented as a convex combination of
the current market state and the natural parameter of his (exponential family) belief
distribution. In this section we will compute the equilibrium state in an exponential
family market with multiple such traders.
We draw a well-known result from game theory regarding the class of potential games.
We say a function f(~x) is at a local optimum if changing any coordinate of ~x does not
increase the value of f .
THEOREM 5.5 (MONDERER AND SHAPLEY [1996]). Let Ui(~δ) be the utility func-
tion of the ith trader given strategies ~δ = (δ1, . . . , δi, . . . , δn). If there exists a potential
function Φ(~δ) such that
Ui(~δ)− Ui(~δ−i, δ
′
i) = Φ(
~δ)− Φ(~δ−i, δ
′
i)
then ~δ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Φ(~δ) is at a local optimum.
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In the exponential family market, the cost function C is identical to the log partition
function T defined in (5). Let ~δ be the matrix of share vectors purchased by every
trader in the market at equilibrium. Let θ be the initial market state, θˆi the natural
parameter of trader i’s belief distribution and ai his risk aversion parameter.
Define a potential function as Φ(~δ) = T (θ +
∑
i δi) +
∑
i
1
ai
T (θˆi − aiδi).
Rather than working directly with the utilities of every trader, we will work with the
log of their utility values.5 Now the log-utility of trader i is
Ui(~δ) = −T (θ+
∑
j
δj) + T (θ +
∑
j 6=i
δj)−
1
ai
T (θˆi − aiδi) +
1
ai
T (θˆi).
We can now apply Theorem 5.5, hence the equilibrium state is obtained by jointly
maximizing Φ(~δ) for each δi:
∇δiΦ(
~δ) = ∇T

θ +
n∑
j=1
δi

−∇T (θˆi − aiδi) = 0.
This leads to the following expression for the final market state.
θ +
n∑
j=1
δj =
θ +
∑n
i=1
(
θˆi
ai
)
1 +
∑n
i=1
1
ai
We see that the equilibrium state is a convex combination of the initial market state
and all agent beliefs, with the latter weighted according to risk tolerance.
6. BUDGET-LIMITED AGGREGATION
In this section, we consider the evolution of the market state when traders are budget-
limited. We assume that the traders trade in multiple instances of the market. As
before, the market price is interpreted as a probability density over the outcome space
and the share vector as the natural parameter of an exponential family distribution.
Consistent with the connections drawn in Section 2 and throughout, we measure the
error in prediction using the standard log loss.
We show that traders with faulty information can only impose a limited amount of ad-
ditional loss to the market’s prediction. Further, since informative traders experience
an expected increase in budget, they will eventually be unconstrained and allowed to
carry out unrestricted trades. Taken together, this means that while the market suf-
fers limited damage from ill-informed traders, it is also able to make use of all the
information from informative traders in the long run.
Budget-limited trades. Let α be the budget of a trader in the market. Suppose that
with infinite budget, the trader would have moved the market state from θ to θˆ, where
θˆ represents his true belief. Now suppose further that α < C(θˆ) − C(θ); that is, the
trader’s budget does not allow for purchasing enough shares to move the market state
to his belief. In this case, we want to budget-limit the trader’s influence on the market
state.
5It is important to note that the potential function analysis still applies for any monotonically increasing
transformation of the traders’ utility functions.
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Let the current market state be given by θ and let the final market state be θ′ =
λθˆ + (1 − λ)θ where λ = min
(
1, α
C(θˆ)−C(θ)
)
. The cost to the trader to move the market
state from θ to θ′ is at most his budget α and is called his budget-limited trade.
Limited Damage. We will now quantify the error in prediction that the market maker
might have to endure as a result of ill-informed entities entering the market. We as-
sume that these entities trade in multiple instances of the market; thus the exposure
of the market maker is over several rounds. The log loss function for θ shares held is
defined as L(θ, x) = − log p(x; θ) = C(θ) − 〈θφ(x)〉.
LEMMA 6.1. The loss induced on the market by an uninformative trader is bounded
by his initial budget.
PROOF. First consider the change in budget of a trader i over multiple rounds of the
prediction market. Let his budget at rounds t and t−1 be αti and α
t−1
i respectively. The
change in budget for trader i moving the market state from θ to θ′ with outcome xt is
αti − α
t−1
i = C(θ)− C(θ
′)− (θ − θ′)Tφ(xt)
= L(θ, xt)− L(θ′, xt) = ∆ti
Where ∆ti is called the myopic impact of a trader i in round t. Thus, the myopic impact
captures incremental gain in prediction due to the trader in a round and is equal to
the change in his budget in that round.
Since the market evolves so that the budget of any trader never falls below zero, the
total myopic impact in T rounds caused due to trader i is ∆i :=
∑T
t=1∆
t
i =
∑T
t=1(α
t
i −
αt−1i ) = α
T
i − α
0
i ≥ −α
0
i .
An interesting aspect of Lemma 6.1 is that the log loss can be quantified in the same
units as the traders’ budgets.
Budget of Informative Traders. We now characterize the expected change in budget for
an informative trader.
LEMMA 6.2. Let θ be the current market state. Suppose that an informative trader
with belief distribution parametrized by θˆ moves the market state to the budget-limited
state θ′ = λθˆ + (1 − λ)θ. Then, the expectation (over the trader’s belief) of the trader’s
profit is strictly positive whenever his budget is positive and his belief differs from the
previous market position θ.
PROOF. Let the cost function C be equal to the log partition function T of the belief
distribution. The payoff is given by the sufficient statistics φ(x). Then, the trader’s
expected net payoff is given by
Ex∼P
θˆ
[C(θ) − C(θ′)− (θ − θ′)φ(x)] = T (θ)− θ∇T (θˆ)− (T (θ′)− θ′∇T (θˆ))
= DT (θ, θˆ)−DT (θ
′, θˆ) ≥ λDT (θ, θˆ) ≥ 0
where DT (·, ·) is the Bregman divergence based on T . The second to last inequality
holds since DT (θ
′, θˆ) is convex in θ′ and we have:
DT (θ
′, θˆ) = DT
(
λθˆ + (1− λ)θ, θˆ
)
≤ λDT (θˆ, θˆ) + (1 − λ)DT (θ, θˆ) = (1− λ)DT (θ, θˆ)
A trader who adjusts the market state may expect positive profit ≥ λDT (θ, θˆ).
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We note one important aspect of Lemma 6.2: the expectation is taken with respect to
each trader’s belief at the time of trade, rather than with respect to the true distribu-
tion. This is needed because we have made no assumptions about the optimality of the
traders’ belief updating procedure. If we assume that the traders’ belief formation is
optimal, then this growth result will extend to the true distribution as well.
Given a continuous density the probability a trader will form exactly the same beliefs
as the current market position is 0, and thus, each trader will have positive expected
profit on almost all sequences of observed samples and beliefs. This result suggests
that, eventually, every informative trader will have the ability to influence the market
state in accordance with his beliefs, without being budget limited.
Notice that Lemma 6.2 only required that the market state to which the trader moves
be representable as a convex combination of the current market state and his belief.
This means that the result holds for exponential utility traders aiming to maximize
their utility by Theorem 5.2. In this case, the trader who moves the market state can
expect his profit to be positive and at least 1
a
DT (θ, θˆ) where a is the exponential utility
parameter. When the cost function is adjusted to Cλ with an inverse liquidity parame-
ter λ as in Section 5, the trader receives an expected payoff of at least 1
a
DT (λθ, θˆ).
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